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The Proposal 
 
1 Introduction 
Like writing, art making is primarily a means of human expression, a means of 
communication – both “allow us to categorize our (inner and outer) environment as 
represented by symbols” (Appignanesi, 1999: 7). Yet it is language in the traditional 
Western garb of rational, philosophical discourse that has been perceived as the primary 
means of manifesting knowledge and positing truth, not only regarding the character of 
human existence, but also the nature of art. This infers the acceptance of both works as 
literally “truth of things”, and of “a language of reason” that “perfectly represents the real 
world” (Appignanesi, 1999: 77). 
 
Going against the grain of this traditional bias, Jacques Derrida holds that, firstly, “human 
knowledge is not as controllable or as cogent as Western thinkers would have it”: 
secondly, that language functions in “subtle and often contradictory ways” thus rendering 
certainty, truth, and perfect representation ever elusive to us (Lye, 1997: 2); and, thirdly, 
that “practices of interpretation which include art but are not limited to language, are 
extended discourses” (Appignanesi, 1999: 79). So, the “work of reason” (or rationalism) in 
this sense, is no longer the definitive “voice” of authority when it comes to ascribing 
meaning, proclaiming a message, defining truth, etc. Having the grip of its authority 
loosened and thus its rigid, imposing borders opened up, the communication of knowledge 
as a form of “aesthetic fiction” (Megill, 1987: 265) is allowed entry into the rarefied field 
of philosophical discourse.  Moreover, if visual art (one such “aesthetic fiction”) is a 
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process of sign-making, as is written and spoken language; if it therefore constitutes a 
signifying system, as does written and spoken language (Bal and Bryson in Preziosi, 1998: 
242); and, if art is not just about autonomous, in-house formalism, then can it not, in any 
case, validly offer a form for discourse, albeit a different kind of discourse, a discourse that 
is not “truth seeking” (Sim, 1992: 33)? Here, the maker of the proposed artwork-as-
discourse would not be attempting to establish the truth or falsity of a philosophical 
position, but, as Derrida would have it, create a form which, without mimicry, would 
evocatively allude to Plato, his “deconstructor” and the maker of the proposed artwork.  
Discourse in this sense, then, would generate “active interpretation … infinite free 
association” (Megill, 1987: 283), because, as in Derrida’s writing, interpretation no longer 
aims at “the reconciliation or unification of warring truths (Sim, 1992: 10); in other words, 
it breaks with the (phal)logocentric tradition of discourse as dialectical and becomes 
questioning without closure. 
 
For visual art to enter the exalted arena of philosophical discourse, it cannot be self-
reflexive in the Greenbergian or formalist sense – it has to be about something 
philosophical and this ‘something’ will be a deconstructive response to Plato’s doctrine of 
the two worlds in the Timaeus.  
 
What I propose presenting, then, is an imagographic rather than (phal)logocentric 
exposition of philosophical content where the aim is not to shape a certainty or to infer an 
absolute presence or essence of anything, but rather to suggest traces of the maker of the 
artwork reading Derrida, reading Plato. The proposed artwork as a response to texts will 
thus be a “pre-text” of my own endeavour. 
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2 The Hypothesis: 
I propose that an imagographic exposition of philosophical content is, in the Derridean 
sense, a valid and meaningful presentation of “extended discourse”. 
 
3 Statement of the Main Problem: 
Is it possible to visually image a philosophical discourse, in this case, a deconstructive 
response to Plato’s doctrine of the two worlds? 
 
4 Statement of the
 
Sub-problems: 
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4.2 What is it that characterizes a Derridean critique of Plato’s  notions 
 regarding the world?  
 
4.3  How best does one originate the images and design their configuration? 
 
4.4  In what sense may it be determined that an artwork is a valid form of 
 philosophical discourse? 
The reason for looking to present an imagographic philosophical discourse is to 
dismantle the “hermetic sensibility that has prevailed amongst self-contained purists” 
(Gleick, p8). There are persons who still live in the shadow of Emmanuel Kant’s 
distinction between theory (the (phal)logocentric decoder of meaning) and practice 
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(realm of the mute image). It is this Plato generated dualism which Derrida is 
especially concerned with attacking (Megill, 1987 p263), given the inference that 
thought is centristically tied to the word, and this, claims Derrida, limits human 
creativity and ingenuity (Sim, 1992 p8). Even more significant to the visual arts, is that 
this dichotomy, which, by apotheosing the artwork and relegating the ‘wordless’ artist 
to the realm of dumb fabricator, has ironically placed the role of mediating meaning in 
the ‘hands’ of the (phal)logocentric non-artist. Furthermore, a visually imaged form of 
discourse, by displacing the orthodox, questions the status of critical discourse, the 
function of fine art practice and their relation. In so doing, both are revitalized and 
refreshed (Carol, 1987: xi) 
 
The proposed artwork-as-discourse is also intended to stand as a reversal of Plato’s 
prioritizing of philosophy over art; of his inference that artists’ mindlessly imitate 
appearances without possessing the slightest knowledge of what is being imitated; and, 
lastly, of his relegation of art to the realm of ‘second-order appearances’ (shadows, 
reflections, illusions, dreams, etc.), where its effect is negligible (Danto, 1986 p6). In 
this regard, my intention is clearly an echo of Derrida’s “reversal of the age-old 
prejudice that elevates philosophy over rhetoric, or right reason over the dissimulating 
arts of language” (Norris, 1990 p54). 
 
Finally, based on proving that visual art is a valid form of philosophical discourse, I 
hope to confirm the perception that it can aptly function as a means of significant 
interchange/intercourse between disparate cultures. 
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What I propose is two phases to the process of addressing the hypothesis: 
1. at a Master’s level, where the production and exhibition of an apt body of art, 
etc., will take place; and, 
2. at a doctoral level, where the issue of whether an artwork can, in fact, stand as a 
valid form of discourse, will be argued. 
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7 Delimitations to the First Phase. 
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8 Assumptions. 
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The Article 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article focuses on a recently created artwork entitled “The Four Fields of X” -  an 
attempt to frame an imagographic1 form of philosophical discourse in the hope that it 
would provide a model of signification not constrained by the logic of (phal)logocentrism 
and, therefore, better suited to suggest the mutability and open-ended dynamism that marks 
our (signified) existence.  Initially, the article involves a description of the artwork’s basis 
– Jacques Derrida’s notion of discourse and language.  The constituent parts of the artwork 
and their allusions to the Timaeus and Derrida are then presented, followed by two 
passages of ‘exit lines’. 
 
THE ARTWORK’S GENESIS 
 
The process of generation was initiated by a wish to articulate a form of discourse that 
would more aptly imply the apparent inter-subjectivity2, uncertainty and uncontrollable / 
uncontainable relativity of our world (Gleick, 1997:5).  Instead of using the “language of 
reason” (the masculinized, authoritarian voice of “objectivity”), that has traditionally been 
used to identify and “absolutely guarantee” a constant, meaning-giving (meta) presence – 
the true, transcendent reality, the essence or totality of everything (Appignanesi, 1999:78);  
my aim was to apply the open-ended dialectic of inter-subjectivity – that is a binary 
dialectic sans the final closure of synthesis in an absolute condition, a shared, non-
authoritarian dialectic or form of exchange that continuously changes its place since it has 
no foundation (Gasché, 1995:33-34) – and this was in order to suggest that knowledge or 
cognitive meaning is relative, indeterminate and uncertain, thus supporting the view of the 
world referred to earlier. 
 
To ‘supplement’ the lop-sided, one-legged tradition of a single ‘master’ code and all that 
that entails, I thought that the most appropriate vehicle would be a “visual model of 
textuality”, a “mistress” in the garb of an assemblage of non-representational, two- and 
three-dimensional objects, images and words, since as Mitchell suggested:  an assemblage 
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has the ability “to cover so many diverse things without revealing any image of totality”, 
i.e. an image of a consistent, centralized binding force (Mitchell, 1994:11,419).  The 
assemblage, the heterogeneity of which would include imprints of its (traditional) other - 
language - would thus lie both inside and outside conventional logical systems of 
signification.  It is this neither-either / or-but-both- (or more) disposition that was thought 
might render the assemblage a site of multiple references and provisional meanings, a site 
that would, therefore, preclude closure in certainty and completeness, that would function 
as a Derridean pharmakon (a poison and remedy). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Conceptual drawing for `Four Fields of X’ 
 
With this in mind, the artwork could not be self-reflexively or formalistically Greenbergian 
– the work obviously had to be philosophical yet without becoming overtly illustrational.  
So, looking at the ‘line of flight’ taken by Western philosophy, it was decided to 
appropriate the beginning point of the trajectory – Platonic metaphysics in the form of the 
Timaeus, given that, according to I. M. Crombie (1952:198), it is Plato’s “main 
cosmological essay”, one that Paul Shorey (1965:298) regards as “the earliest and grandest 
statement of the teleological view outside the Bible”.  As such, it has been “utterly 
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pervasive in Western culture”, and it was therefore decided to apply to it what I perceive as 
being at this trajectory’s other end, namely, Derrida’s radically relative (contextual) 
methods of reading texts i.e. his form of inquiry which has sought to overcome the 
dominance of among others, the reality-appearance distinction in Western thought.  More 
specifically, then, the assemblage would “stand” as a Derridean response that refers to, 
differs from and defers validating Plato’s claims in the Timaeus: 
 
That there is an intelligible realm of eternal, unchanging, perfect forms;  a set of 
abstract universals based on elementary, geometric form – the realm of “being”, which 
provides humans / mortals with a “divine paradigm”;   
That the sensible world is a dimension of primitive, chaotic, random events / 
phenomena – the realm of “becoming”; 
That there is an agent, a demiourgos, a “craftsman” who, through necessity and 
intellect, orders the sensible world according to the model of perfect forms. 
Ironically, Plato also intimates that there is a space, a “receptacle” described as the “nurse 
of becoming” who / which can accommodate the process of ordering (Lee, 1965:9, 47 & 
70;  Ross, 1961:127;  Crombie, 1952 – 63:199 – 236;  Grube, 1995:1 – 50 and Cornford, 
1937:21 – 239). (This “receptacle’s” likeness to  Derrida’s différance, a “quasi-
transcendental”, will be dealt with later).  
 
The donning of Derrida’s deconstructive spectacles (bi-focals?), seemed fitting in the light 
of an attempt to image philosophical discourse visually, that is to render and recognize 
Fine Art practice as a valid and apt means of or opportunity for the investigation and 
communication of a “view” not centristically bound to a secure and certain ground. While 
image definitions and configurations may not be synonymous with language in its 
abstractness, this does not mean that similar relationships of import and significance 
cannot be embodied in imagic form. The spatial composition of images in relation to one 
another, serve just as well as the linguistic form of discourse to indicate hierarchies, 
positions of power, dominance or subjugation. In conversation, Olivier cited the example 
of a family photograph where the father occupies a central position. In the case of non-
representational images, they are not only able to manifest meaning through their 
disposition an in artwork; but by their irregularity and abstractness, are also able to express 
an ambiguity and obliqueness that relates to Derrida’s notions of language as metaphor and 
discourse without closure (see pp 6-8).  Moreover, it was thought that since the 
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assemblage’s components would be non-representational, they would not point to the kind 
of presence suggested by mimetic imagery;  in other words, a kind of presence that in the 
realm of the word, Plato ascribed to speech, thus privileging it over writing, its graphic, 
second-rate representation3.  In this way it was hoped that the assemblage would carry a re-
markable re-semblance to what Derrida in Dissemination (1982:110) describes as the 
activity of writing, i.e. of writing as “grammatology”:  a process of differing that defers 
closure in a “transcendental signified” – Plato’s indispensable, yet unrepresentable source 
of meaning.  For, according to Derrida, it is in the absence of a “transcendental signified”, 
of an ultimate, the-buck-stops-here referent, that “the domain and play of signification” is 
infinitely extended (Wood and Bernasconi, 1988:280). It should be mentioned that the aim 
here was not to deny verbal and written discourse its valid occupancy in the world. 
Through the inclusion of words, phrases and blocks of text in the artwork, the intention 
was rather to re-form its relationship with visual art so that, by losing its “unequivocal 
domination” as a mode of signification, an interplay between two distinct yet equally 
valuable players in an extended field of relations would result (Mitchell, 1995:84).  
 
 
Figure 2 
Detail of one of the 17 texts:`The Seven Bowls of Sameness and Difference’. 
 
So, fundamental to shaping the work, was some understanding of how Derrida “views” the 
traditional, dialectical means used by Western metaphysicians from Plato onwards, to 
articulate discourses that claimed to establish the usually underlying or overriding truth of 
things, that is the “immaterial true world of reality” as opposed to the relative, sensory 
“world of appearance” (Rorty, 1999;1).  This involves… 
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The dethroning of logos 
 
In Dissemination (1981:  166 – 68), Derrida puts forward the notion that philosophical 
discourse involves patricide; in other words, in the presence of the Father – logos, God, the 
Ideal, the Absolute, the Truth, the Original, the Universal – discourse cannot unfold 
because, in the unimaginable realm of “absolute being” (the locus of the Father, etc.), there 
is no room for difference, for the “other”, and, insists Derrida, “the very condition of 
discourse – true-or-false – is the diacritical principle of sumploké ”, the incessant 
interweaving of differentiations and distinctions that can only take place in the realm of 
writing, i.e. within a process of signification.  Because signs are characterized by this 
diacritical / differential principle, they cannot point to an independent concept or idea that 
constitutes their immutable essence or origin – what is signified by a signifier is, in any 
case, in itself defined by its relative position within a differential organization of signs.  An 
integral part of sumploké, of the warp and woof of Derridean discourse, is space, because it 
is where gaps occur that “alterity” (the web of differences and deferrals) is suggested.  This 
is where discourse is at its most critical (in so far as it resists any attempt at “centering”), 
and not, as has occurred traditionally, where it strives to reach closure, finality, certainty in 
some extra-linguistic condition or referent. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
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Detail of one of the seven bowls. 
 
Now the style of language or the kind of discourse traditionally used by metaphysicians to 
posit their claims about the truth residing beyond the world of apparent phenomena, is, 
according to Derrida (Dissemination, 1981:76), (phal) logocentric4 because implicit in it 
(explicit in Plato’s dialogues), is the assignation of “the origin and power of speech, 
precisely of logos, to the paternal position” – the presence of a centristically placed, 
originary “überfather” (the masculine as the absolute qualifying condition of being), 
assures the authority of what is being communicated regarding truth, but in so doing, also 
limits the truth (meaning) by enclosure.  Contrary to this, Derrida suggests that for written 
discourse to be “proper”, it “ought to submit to the laws of life” (to time and space), “just 
as living discourse”, i.e. discourse without closure “does” (Dissemination, 1981:79).  The 
writing that Derrida therefore proposes, is a kind that introduces a destabilizing moment 
into philosophical discourse because, according to him, its sequential “unfoldment” 
involves spacing and spacing implies timing – space “facilitates” differentiation, while 
time “allows” deferral, deferral of “the immediacy of presence” (Of Grammatology in 
Kamuf, 1991:47), of the Father, that non-spatial, atemporal principle which Plato used to 
preference speech over writing;  or, metaphorically, the father over the son.  The order that 
Derrida’s writing implies, then, is the continually differentiating and deferring play of 
same and other (Dissemination, 1981:62).  As such, writing as well as speech is a process 
of inscription that harbours “the complicity of contrary values”; that has no “ideal, stable 
or fixed identity” and, consequently, produces multiple meanings through “an endless play 
of differences” (Dissemination, 1981:126, 129). 
 
The thrust that differentiates, that fragments the solidity of any phenomenon or notion into 
innumerable shards of possibility is attributed to woman by Derrida.  In “Spurs:  
Nietzsche’s Styles” (in Kamuf, 1991:362), he suggests that philosophical discourse as a 
means of establishing stable meaning and identity is confounded, stopped short in its tracks 
by woman, not because she presents an alternative truth or untruth, but because she 
differentiates.  Under the rubric of (phal) logocentricity, female sexuality is negatively 
represented; while male sexuality is given positive representation in the form of the 
symbolic father, the (omni) potent patriarch.  As such, however, the male subject (as other 
than father) is alienated, i.e. restricted in his field of operation to an order that seeks 
“continuous meaning” and “stable identity” (Michelfelder and Palmer, 1989:81) in a 
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centristically placed, omnipresent, paternal principle or essence.  On the other hand, 
excluded from this “arena”, the female subject is rendered unfathomably “other”.  From a 
patriarchal perspective, she thus becomes a dark force that threatens to disrupt or 
destabilize (phal) logocentric order.  Her expulsion from the patriarch’s palace or the 
father’s fort (fortress?), means that she escapes the strictures of his structure, and as an 
escapee not subject to his laws, is free “to engulf and enveil any vestige of essentiality, of 
identity, of properness” (Spurs in Kamuf, 1991:359).  This is reflected in the third of three 
positions that Derrida claims (Nietzsche’s) woman occupies in relation to truth, and that is 
the one in which she eludes the truth-non-truth dichotomy inherent in Western 
metaphysics:  “beyond the double negation” – that is of her identification with either truth 
(the idealized female), or untruth (the debased figure of falsehood) – she is recognized “as 
an affirmative power, a dissimulatress, an artist, a dionysiac” (Michelfelder and Palmer, 
1989:81).  In this position, where the “transcendental signified” that gives the Western 
symbolic order its coherence (Silverman, 1983:131) is absent, woman is the indecisive and 
indeterminable process of inscription that for Derrida is writing.  (Spurs in Kamuf, 
1999:354).  Here woman functions as a metaphor for “playfulness and artistry, for an 
artist’s philosophy” (Michelfelder and Palmer, 1989:82), a philosophy that shakes loose 
the elements of a (signifying) structure from the constraining corset of (phal) 
logocentricity. 
 
 
Figure 4 
The four`Scrolls’. 
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Woman as a metaphor for inscription / writing points to Derrida’s notion of language as 
fissured, loxic, complex, figurative, indirect, aphoristic, metaphoric, which, in my attempt 
to transgress5 the (phal) logocentric convention that discourse has only one form, the 
language of reason, I have identified with Fine Art practice.  Consequently, what follows is 
a dip into Derrida’s world of language-as-metaphor (a pharmacopoeia?). 
 
Pharmakon:  Derrida’s writing 
 
In “Of Grammatology” (Kamuf, 1991:38), Derrida proposes that language, the word, is a 
metaphor in as much as it ambivalently stands in for something that is not present and does 
not share the same form.  For example, logocentric discourse implies the omnipresence of 
an inaudible, wordless voice, “the voice of being”, of God, yet the means of implication 
(paradoxically, ironically) is language, which in both its aural and written forms, is 
distinctly sensible and temporal, phenomenal rather than noumenal.  This paradox 
indicates an interaction between the sensible word (the distorting, derived form, according 
to Plato) and its incorporeal referent (“the originary” from Plato’s perspective) – or 
between a phenomenal signifier and the noumenal signified – that is not direct, not straight 
forward, not exact.  Although Derrida maintains that “the difference between the sign and 
the signified is nothing” (Of Grammatology in Kamuf, 1991:36);  the distinction between 
the sign and its referent suggests a relation based on deferral because the sign is displaced 
by what comes after it in a temporal chain of signification;  and based on difference, a 
difference that while it gives shape to, articulates meaning, also precludes exactitude, 
certainty and singularity of meaning because “embedded” in the sign, is the “silent trace” 
of that from which it differs (Of Grammatology in Kamuf, 1991:42-7).  It is this movement 
of deferring in time and differing across space, this différance, as Derrida coined the 
configuration that is writing, that displaces the centricity of logos, that places the 
“centralized presence” relative to its opposite, that in fact “hinges” all oppositions, leaving 
signs to swing both ways.  (Différance in Kamuf, 1991:61-66).  So in this sense, language 
is metaphorical rather than literal;  or as Derrida would have it:  “the literal meaning of 
writing (language) is metaphoricity itself” and “metaphoricity itself cannot have an 
ultimate referent in some eternal, immaterial present” (Of Grammatology in Kamuf, 
1991:15), in an irreducible, “transcendental signified” or referent that is distinctly other, 
that is outside time-space.  In other words, language cannot be totalized because it has no 
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absolute or ideal identity and because the signified / signifier is endlessly commutable 
(Dissemination, 1981:126). 
 
 
Figure 5 
The `Hanging Seed’. 
 
By oblique reversal and displacement in “Plato’s Pharmacy”, Derrida de-centres Plato’s 
inflexible, hierarchical relation between the originary (best represented by speech, claims 
Plato), and the derived (writing, according to Plato);  and he does so with an ambivalent 
term to which Plato through Socrates likened writing, namely, pharmakon (in Greek it 
means both remedy and  poison).  While Plato presents writing as a “remedial poison” for 
a deficient memory, a “harmful substance” because it distances us from the presence of the 
ideal, the real, the proper etc.;  Derrida uses the term to describe the “neither / nor that is 
simultaneously either / or”, non-binary logic that for him characterizes writing as 
metaphoric, as the play of différance: 
 
If the pharmakon is ‘ambivalent’, it is because it constitutes the medium in 
which opposites are opposed, the movement and the play that link them among 
themselves, reverses them or makes one side cross over into the other (soul / 
body, good / evil, inside / outside, memory / forgetfulness, speech / writing, 
etc.) (Dissemination, 1981:127).   
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In its ambivalence, the pharmakon does not unify opposites, distinctions, differences, but 
with its dual personality (multiple, if you take into account that in Greek, pharmakon also 
means paint, “an artificial tint” (Dissemination, 1981:128), it mediates them, it is the site of 
their exchange, the means, the form of their interrelation not their synthesis in an “ideal 
identity” (Dissemination, 1981:126).  Without this “ideal identity” – the Platonic, ever-
present centre, the “transcend-dental signified”, the restrictive, stentorian father – the 
“freeze” on time-space is lifted and marked by a ceaseless play of difference, a “dialectic 
of weaving between same and other” (Haar in Wood, 1992:61), that is Derrida’s 
pharmakon (Dissemination, 1981:  127 – 28).  As such, writing (including, ironically, 
Plato’s texts),  signification, is the dissemination, the “seminal scattering” in time and 
through space of multiple truths / readings / interpretations. 
 
What language-as-metaphor implies, then, is “incomplete signification” that, like Derrida’s 
neologism différance, has “double, contradictory, undecidable value” in that it defers the 
determinability of meaning (Double Session in Kamuf, 1991:  190). 
 
It is this “vision” of language as metaphoric, enigmatic, that led to my appropriation and 
application of it to Fine Art practice in order to transgress the limit imposed on discourse 
by (phal) logocentricity.  The result is an assemblage of objects and words as multivocal 
signifiers that leave clues but offer no solution, no resolution because the directions in 
which theses signifiers move have no final resting place.  Unlike (phal) logocentric 
discourse, which appears to run along a narrow-gauge track from an unreal, false, 
ephemeral departure point, to a real, eternal, paternal and true destination; the signifiers in 
this artwork just refer to more signifiers that refer to more signifiers, ever postponing the 
arrival at a point of certainty and absolute meaning.  Thus it was hoped that an 
imagographic form of philosophical discourse, that like Derrida’s “poetic performance” 
(Kamuf, 1999:144), no longer uses rationalism to posit closure in some transcendent, and, 
therefore beyond-our-frame-of-reference condition, would offer a means of critical inquiry;  
one which by throwing the viewer / reader “into the realm of complex, contested, 
symbolized, intertextual, interactive, mediated experience” (Lye, 1996:5), might result in 
the realization of our signified world’s mutability, multiplicity and relativity. 
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THE (DE?) CODING OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONTENT IN “THE FOUR FIELDS 
OF X” 
 
What follows should not be read / viewed as the key to de-ciphering the artwork – that 
would be to clap hands in unison with the one-truth, one-meaning brigade.  Instead, in the 
wake of Derrida and the making of the assemblage, comes a written reco(r)ding that 
provisionally traces possibilities of meaning – through “figures of speech?” 
 
Plato’s cave / Derrida’s umbrella:  the pyramid 
(cf. fig. 1) 
 
Like all the other images that constitute this work, the open, four-sided pyramid is a 
manifold signifier, one that spins a web of significances. 
 
As a reductive, abstract, geometric form, it may be taken as a reference to Plato’s 
uncreated, ideal, intelligible realm of eternal, unchanging, perfect, non-composite forms 
that are imperceptible to the senses, that provide the demiourgos (the “divine craftsman”, 
the “nurse of becoming”), with a model for ordering the fluctuating, sensible world.  It also 
points to the fact that Plato’s ideal, incorporeal model, paradoxically, can only be 
expressed, be known through its articulation as a sensible sign of indeterminate meaning 
and, therefore, open to interpretation. 
 
Ruffling the “clean” line of the pyramid’s geometric form, are series of toothpicks 
protruding from the outer edges of the four posts.  These “spines” imprint upon the 
pyramid a mark of its non-mathematical other - organic life, nature, the imperfect, chaotic 
alternate to Plato’s transcendental, intelligible realm. 
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Figure 6 
General view of the finished installation: `Four Fields of X’. 
 
As an open frame rather than a solid form, the pyramid does not so much displace  lived 
space to speak exclusively of perfect triangularity, but becomes a container, a receptacle of 
what is contrary to it.  Introduced into the “ belly” of father logos (the pyramid as ideal 
form), is the spacious mother, the Timaeus’s “nurse of becoming” and her progeny, 
sensible phenomena.  Thus the three aspects of Plato’s cosmology described in the 
Timaeus – the two worlds of “being” and “becoming” and khora as space – intermingle in 
a manner that suggests the “paradox and contradiction in which univocality gives way to 
equivocality” (Taylor, 1992:193). 
 
Also, as an open frame, the pyramid alludes to Derrida’s umbrella, i.e. his “spurring style”, 
an “undecidable process of signification, a type of critique that wards off determinable 
meaning” (Spurs in Kamuf, 1999:356).  Unfolded (as the pyramid suggests) the umbrella is 
a metaphor for the “affirmative writing of the feminine” (Kamuf, 1991:354), that 
“dissimulatress” that is Derrida’s pharmakon. 
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The view of the pyramid’s four posts as an X, might be assumed a reference to the 
description of the soul in the Timaeus, i.e. to the crossing of the two rings into which the 
strip of ingredients constituting “the soul of the universe” and the “souls of the living 
creatures within it” was compounded and divided by the demiourgos, the Divine 
Craftsman (more about this later), in order “to set the world upon its unceasing course of 
intelligent life” (Cornford, 1937:58).  At the same time, the ‘X’ as an intersection, a 
crossroad, alludes to Derrida’s description of the Timaeus’s demiourgic operation:  it 
figures “the double gesture” which “leads nowhere in particular and particularly not to a 
point of mathematically determined harmony” (order) (Truth in Painting, 1987:166). 
 
Textus:  the hanging seed 
(cf. Fig. 5) 
From the pyramid’s apex, hanging like a pendulum – “emblem of classical mechanics, 
exemplar of constrained action, epitome of clockwork regularity” (Gleick, 1997:39) – is an 
irregular form with a scabrous surface that given its non-Euclidean irregularity, might be 
taken to represent what Plato perceived as the imperfect, changing, disordered dimension 
of primitive chaos (Lee, 1965:71 – 72);  the sensible and phenomenal appearance as 
opposed to the intelligible and noumenal thought object. 
 
Because of its placement, it might also be “read” as a signifier of essence, of a 
metaphysical, ever-present core, which gives meaning and certainty to everything around 
it.  However, because the seed’s centrality is relative to the pyramid that enframes it, it 
“cedes” its apparent essentiality to what surrounds it.  Defined by contrast, by difference 
within itself and outside of it, the seed suggests that the core of our existence, our universe 
(multiverse?) is not essence but as Derrida suggests, différance.  In this way the seed could 
be seen as a reference to Derrida’s denial of the possibility of an abiding, atemporal, 
privileged condition of being (Sim, 1992:24);  in other words, an irreplaceable centre that 
is the origin, the foundation of all things, or that in semiotics is the “transcendental 
signified”, the unrepresentable, ultimate source of meaning, the absolute referent. 
 
The woven cloth and layers of hidden criss-crossed strips of text on paper that constitute 
the bulk of this image’s form, may be said to relate to the idea that “texts are created by 
weaving together” words and concepts which “can be read in many ways” (Taylor, 
1999:32).  So, in this sense, the seed points to Derrida’s notion of textuality as a point of 
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intersecting, interrelating oppositions;  a point, moreover, that shifts, that is extended into a 
web as each reader engages with it.  As such, the seed may be described as a cipher of 
sumploké. 
 
Quadrature:  the square base 
 
Surrounding the pyramid on its outside, is a twenty-five centimeter wide, double-layered 
border that frames the space that is the pyramid’s base, its “square mouth”.  This “square 
mouth” is the opening through which certainty escapes the “decoder of meaning”, the 
“purveyor of truth” (Dissemination, 1981:297).  It is the gap or space that is neither one 
thing nor its opposite, neither a mixture nor a synthesis, because (metaphorically) it opens 
out into infinity – a suggestion made by the fact that as a base it is not solid, stable as a 
foundation should be; rather it is a frame, an “outline”.  In other words, the “base” is an 
oblique reference to Derrida’s insistence that by means of “squares, crossroads and other 
four-sided figures… a violent but imperceptible displacement of the triangular – 
Dialectical, Trinitarian, Oedipal – foundations of Western thought” (Dissemination, 
1981:xxxii), can be worked to dismantle “the Platonic order of presence (Megill, 
1987:247). 
 
The four scrolls 
(cf. Fig. 4) 
 
Marking the four points of the “square mouth”, are missives, dispatches, textual passages, 
coded bytes of knowledge, scrolled and enfolded to appear as simulacra of viscera, viscera 
that infer embodiment.  These objects may be interpreted as two-way allusions:  on the one 
hand, to the ‘belief’ expressed in the Timaeus that the visible world of sensory experience 
(the lower order of “becoming”), is separate to and distinct from an invisible higher realm 
of “eternal and unchanging being”, one possessed by five perfect, geometric forms and 
“dialectic which yield a severely grounded apprehension of truth and reality” (Cornford, 
1937:24);  and, on the other hand, to the notion that intelligibility (making sense of the 
world through systems of signification), lies in sensibility.  In contrast to Plato, Derrida 
sites Edmund Husserl’s recognition “that ideas are not eternal or simply there”, but “are 
constructed or produced out of the experience of living beings”.  Ideas, claims Derrida, are 
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inextricably bound to embodiment and vice versa, as ‘traces’ of the other (Zuckert, 
1996:203). 
 
So, the (phal)logocentric distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, between 
materiality and ideality is untenable, as Derrida would have it, because it presupposes the 
singularity, if not absoluteness, of truth and meaning (Dissemination, 1981:  xxxix) 
 
The seven bowls of sameness and difference 
(cf. Fig. 3) 
 
The seven bowls, three containing cones of stitched, spiraling strips of cloth and four 
empty, form a circle within the space that is the pyramid’s base.  With regard to the 
Timaeus, they indirectly refer to the composition of soul as a long, proportionately divided 
strip of indivisible and divisible existence, indivisible and divisible sameness and 
indivisible and divisible difference, which has been cut lengthwise into two, placed 
crosswise and then bent round to form two rings (Lee, 1965:46).  The demiourgos 
endowed one with “the motion of sameness and similarity”, and the other, further 
subdivided and split into seven orbits, with the “motion of difference”.  As two rotating 
circles, the outer orbit of sameness has “charge over the relations between universals while 
the inner orbit of difference has “charge over the relations between particulars” (Crombie, 
1952-63:  212-14) – the play of différance? 
 
From a Derridean perspective, the circularity of the bowls and their placement, and the 
partially revealed / concealed portions of text and alphabetic letters (signifiers of the 
preferred medium of discourse), suggest the circulation of ideas or theories, within a 
prescribed boundary – in other words, “traces” of discourse encircled, circumscribed by the 
(phal) logocentric metaphysics of presence (Kamuf, 1991:464).  Furthermore, the bowls’ 
composition out of strips of text, poetically “figure” Derrida’s claim that the soul, like the 
eidos, is a concept, and like all concepts cannot be without signification, without definition 
by the “graphic” of difference, the ambivalent pharmakon (Dissemination, 1981:127). 
 
Scribbles:  twelve pictures of text / ure 
(cf. Fig. 2) 
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Twelve box-framed paper sheets with displaced fragments of the Timaeus in a number of 
typefaces, sizes and mediums, and unevenly printed in reverse on their surfaces, suggest 
the loss of the voice of reason, its distortion by disjointed, mirrored representations.  Also, 
because of the way in which they have been applied, they may be read / viewed as both 
text and texture.  In each of the panels these disparate reproductions of Plato’s dialogue, 
surround an open, hardcover book that is sans leaves of text, a book thus de-scribed, freed 
of its singular scribe, its author, its “authoritative” source of meaning.  Substituting what 
normally constitutes a book, are montages, re-worked phrases and geometric figures from 
the Timaeus.  As a result there is no dialogue, no maieusis, just a number of elusive, 
metaphoric, sometimes parodic references to Plato’s (phal) logocentric notions. 
 
The placement of the panels is also significant:  In as much as these panels of text form a 
border around the pyramid and its contents, they may be seen as referents to the traditional 
philosophical attempts at giving art a frame(work) of understanding, that is to the classical 
determination of art by philosophy / art theory (Carroll, 1987:132).  However, what the 
placement of the unreadable (the pyramid) and the readable (the panels of text) under one 
umbrella (Derrida’s) does, is to re-inscribe the boundaries between the two disciplines 
albeit with a difference.  In this sense, the border is more of a passage that, because it lies 
within the artwork, ruptures the traditional distinction between Fine Art practice and 
philosophy / art theory – they are no longer definitively exterior to each other.  The 
passage thus presents the viewer / reader with a “double session” that is not a repeat 
performance.  In this way, the viewer / reader is folded into the fabric of an artwork, one 
that bears “traces” of its maker interpreting Derrida, interpreting Plato in the guise of the 
Timaeus. 
 
The composition:  a con-centric con-figuring 
(cf. Fig. 6) 
 
Considering the intent to transgress (phal) logocentricity, some explanation seems 
necessary to justify the assemblage’s symmetry: 
 
To have taken the planes of the pyramid and placed them at odd angles to each other, and 
then to have randomly scattered the other elements constituting the artwork, would have 
been to literally apply and, therefore, to contradict Derrida’s notion of language-as-
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metaphor.  Furthermore, a composition of the kind just described, would have indicated the 
collapse of order altogether, when the point was not to establish its opposite, chaos, but 
rather to prevent the imposition of any form of total(itarian) order, an inflexible, inhibiting, 
prescriptive order not open to interpretation because of totalization by an omniscient 
omnipresent.  The symmetrical arrangement of components that are irregular to varying 
degrees, defines an identity that is as ambivalent as Derrida’s pharmakon.  As such, the 
presence of symmetry and irregularity suggests the play of order in poiesis. 
 
The placement of objects in “The Four Fields of X” may also be described as con-centric, 
con(tra)-centric – the common centre that the assemblage’s parts share, the “seed”, is 
relative to what is not centrally situated.  Following Derrida, the composition (like any 
system), is not denied a centre (order), but given one without the privilege of occupying an 
irreplaceable, absolute position.  Metaphorically decentred, the configuration is able to 
function as a “pharmacy whose signifiers are freed from logos” (Dissemination, 1981:144). 
 
Lastly, although the symmetrical, cluster-like arrangement of pieces that form the 
assemblage may seem to negate the basis on which Derrida posited deferral – the 
sequential unfolding of signifiers in space; it does not do so in the instance of the panels of 
text surrounding the pyramid because they require viewing / reading one at a time, one 
after the other.  As far as the composition as a whole is concerned, the chain of 
signification that is written, spoken and filmic language, has been “curved” by con-
(tra)centricity to suggest the nonlinearity6 of Derridean language. However, of more 
significance here, is the fact that the work is both sequential (i.e. its detail arranged 
systematically), and non-sequential  (the work can be viewed as a whole). 
 
EXIT LINES 
“The Four Fields of X” is a tract of inter-subjectivity, it is not a self-sufficient, specific 
something yielding a one-off, fixed message;  but is rather a complex intersection of 
envisioned and textualized interpretations that the viewer physically moves into and, in 
turn, interprets in relation to his / her world – yet another “web of non-binding relations” 
(Zuckert, 1996:201).  As such, “The Four Fields of X” is not an excavation site where, by 
peeling away and discarding encrusted, obscuring layers of irrelevant material, the 
artwork’s quintessential meaning may be extracted.  It is rather a matter of “folding” into 
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the world of metaphor, or, more specifically, Derrida’s world of “radical metaphoricity”, 
which is, according to him, the realm of language. 
 
As a “playful” and “artistic” response to philosophical texts, that is as a system of 
multivalent referral rather than a problem solving, truth seeking discourse, the multi-
dimensional, mixed -media “artist’s philosophy” that is “The Four Fields of X”, also refers 
to what Derrida finds in the differentiating woman from Spurs – “an antidote to” rather 
than the doting aunty of “univocal meaning and intelligible continuity” (Michelfelder and 
Palmer, 1989:82).  The diverse and heterogeneous objects forming the assemblage – 
objects differing in medium, shape and texture – “de-scribe” the pluralistic nature or 
character of the “spurring dissimulatress”, that “undecidable process of inscription” that is 
Derrida’s pharmakon (Spurs in Kamuf, 1991:372-35). 
End notes 
 
1. A term used to denote a combination of image and word. 
2. By “inter-subjectivity” I mean an outlook or view that, because it arises from a 
subject that is a matrix of shifting relations and signification, is interdependent, 
mutable, unstable, impermanent. 
3. This applies to philosophical discourse that relates to a use of language where a 
specific conception of reason is inscribed in the value relationships by which it 
is structured – for example, where the male pronoun is privileged, where 
sensibility is subordinated to intelligibility, etc. (Olivier, 2002). 
4. For Plato, the speaking subject implies a self-presence, an immediacy of being 
that escapes the limits of time-space (Dissemination, 1981:127). 
5. Alice Jardine pointed out that since logocentric logic has been coded “male”, 
the other “logic of spacing, ambiguity, figuration and indirection are often 
coded as “female”; therefore, “a critique of logocentrism can enable a critique 
of phallogocentrism as well” (Lye, 1996:6) – hence my use of the term (phal) 
logocentrism to imply the masculine character of an abiding, authority-giving 
presence that inhabits traditional philosophical discourse. 
6. In this instance, transgression does not imply a process of replacing one system 
of signification with another;  but rather the lifting of the limit imposed on 
discourse by the privileged, masculinized voice of reason so that a play of 
“languages”, of texts may occur. 
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7. According to Gleick (1997:250-51) non-linearity introduced the unpredictable, 
the apparently random into “classical deterministic systems”.  Non-linear 
systems generally, he claims, cannot be taken apart and put together again – the 
pieces just do not add up, cannot be calculated, pinned down (23-24). 
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